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Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 485
(1970).
It was found that the State had two ad-
ditional interests at stake. First, the grant-
ing of benefits would place the employer
at an unfair disadvantage in negotiations
with the unions. The employer's costs go
up with every laid-off worker who is
qualified to collect unemployment. The
only way for the employer to stop its ris-
ing costs is to settle the strike so as to
return the employees to work. Qualifica-
tion for unemployment compensation
thus acts as a lever, increasing the pres-
sure on an employer to settle a strike. The
State chose to leave this lever in existence
for situations in which the employer
locked out his employees, but to eliminate
it if the union made the strike move. The
approach taken by Ohio was found not to
be irrational. 97 S.Ct. at 1910. Secondly,
the State had an interest in protecting the
fiscal integrity of its compensation fund
and the statute was rationally related to
this interest.
The Court was unable to discern the
basis for a claim that Hodory had been
denied substantive due process of law and
Hodory made no claim of denial of pro-
cedural due process.
Voluntary affirmative action, called
into question in the context of admission
to professional schools in Bakke v.
Regents of the University of California,
18 Cal.3d 34, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553
P.2d 1152 (1976), cert. granted, 429
U.S. 1090 (1977), suffered a setback in
the recent case of Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d
216 (5th Cir. 1977). In Weber, the Fifth
Circuit found that a joint program of affir-
mative action entered into by a union and
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employer violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2
et seq. The affirmative action before the
court was a quota which was established
for admittance into an on-the-job training
program for entry into the craft positions
in all Kaiser plants. Its effect was to create
an entrance ratio of one minority worker
to each white until the percentage of
minority craft workers roughly approxi-
mated the proportion of minorities in the
surrounding local population.
The district court found the training
program defective on two grounds: One,
only courts may implement quota relief
and even then only with great caution;
Two, under the facts of this case a quota
system would not be warranted even if or
dered by the court in light of the fact that
those preferred workers were not iden-
tifiable victims of discrimination and
there had, in fact, been no past dis-
crimination by this employer. The circuit
court affirmed on the second ground only,
holding that while voluntary compliance
with Title VII was laudable and preferable
to litigation, the facts of this case did not
warrant quota relief. Despite the court's
support for voluntary compliance, the
decision in Weber can be expected to dis
courage that remedy. Essential to the
court's ruling was the finding by the dis-
trict judge that there had been no proof of
past discrimination by Kaiser, this despite
an apparent disparity between the propor-
tion of black craftsmen at Kaiser and the
percentage of blacks in the local popula-
tion. The court was unconvinced by the
employer's argument that the the effects
of past societal discrimination were far-
reaching and could be remedied only
through a "one-for-one" training pro-
gram.
Equally unconvincing was the argu-
ment that the quota system was instituted
at the behest of the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC) in its attempt
to enforce Executive Order 11246, 30
Fed. Reg. 12319, which requires federal
contractors to take affirmative action to
obtain a fair percentage of minorities in
their workforces. On this point, the dis-
trict court had found that the collective
bargaining agreement in question
"reflected less of a desire on Kaiser's part
to train black craft workers than a self in-
terest in satisfying the OFCC in order to
retain lucrative government contracts."
563 F.2d at 226. While the circuit court
recognized the legitimacy of affirmative
action plans implemented under Execu-
tive Order 11246, such as the "Philadel-
phia Plan", see Contractors Ass'n of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 854 (1971), it held that
in the absence of prior discrimination, the
Executive Order may not override the
contradictory congressional provision
against quota hiring found in Section
703(d) of Title VII.
This decision places an employer in the
bind of having to choose between await-
ing litigation charging past racial bias
against blacks or other minorities or in-
itiating a plan to remedy the underutiliza-
tion of minorities and inviting a reverse
discrimination charge. It is difficult to
conceive of employers who would be will-
ing to admit a past pattern or practice of
minority discrimination prior to imple-
menting affirmative action plans volun-
tarily or with the encouragement of
OFCC.
Judge Wisdom, in his dissent, pointed
out that the majority in Weber requires
the employer to guess what a district
court might find in the event that
employer is sued for discrimination.
Should the employer guess that the dis-
trict court would find past discrimination,
and thus institute a voluntary affirmative
Cill ,
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action plan, no reverse discrimination suit
will lie. In the context of Weber, where
the union and employer wrote a national
contract covering fifteen different plants,
each with its own employment history,
the employer would have to predict how
the federal courts in different districts
would interpret each plant's employment
history before proceeding with voluntary
compliance. The dissent notes:
Employers and unions would be liable
unless they instituted exactly what a
reviewing court felt should have been
instituted. They could either bring
declaratory judgment actions or wait to
be sued. Under either alternative, our
dockets would be filled with more Title
VII suits, the congressional emphasis on
voluntary conciliation would be frustr
ated, and the elimination of the blight
of racial discrimination would be still
further delayed.
563 F.2d at 230.
An example of the peril of anticipating
what a district judge might find is Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 46
U.S.L.W. 2463 (E.D. Mich. 1978). In this
case, upon being sued for reverse dis-
crimination, the defendants pointed to a
history of unconstitutional treatment of
blacks as reasonable justiication for a fifty
percent racial preference plan. Judge
Kaess held, however, that under the deci-
sion of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), statistics alone do not show
constitutional violation but must be
proven to be the result of purposeful dis-
crimination. When the employer in Young
enacted its preference plan in 1974, it
reasonably could not anticipate the
Supreme Court's decision in Davis (that
purposeful discrimination must be
proven) which is seen by some as a clear
departure from the trend of the Court's
decisions under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Even if the employer in Young had
anticipated Davis, it would further have
had to guess its application to a case
where the past employment/promotion
practice it attempted to remedy was
clearly discriminatory in effect if not in
purpose, but still not considered by Judge
Kaess to be sufficient to legitimize affir-
mative action relief.
The dissent in Weber takes issue with
the finding that Kaiser had not discrimi-
nated against blacks, pointing out that
~1
Kaiser may have used testing devices
which adversely affected blacks, and prior
to 1974 required that all employees have
prior experience in the crafts in order to
enter its training program.
While these two arguable violations
clearly do not support a finding of dis-
crimination, the natural reluctance on the
part of an employer to admit discrimina-
tion is noted by Judge Wisdom. Rather
than require such an admission of dis-
crimination, the dissent would opt for a
showing that the plan was a reasonable
solution to prior discrimination, admit-
tedly purposeful or not. This is similar to
the approach taken recently by the EEOC
in its proposed guidelines on remedial
and/or affirmative action, 42 Fed.Reg.
64826 (12 28-77), which attempt to in-
sulate an employer from reverse dis-
crimination charges regarding plans
adopted by employers who have a reason-
able basis for concluding that they might
be held in violation of Title VII if they fail
to act. The dissent further would find that
the past history of discrimination in the
trades is so substantial as to support an
affirmative action plan of the kind
adopted by Kaiser. Again, Judge Wisdom
would opt for a reasonable preference for
a reasonable period of time, as was imple-
mented here.
While Judge Wisdom does not reach
that part of the majority's opinion dealing
with the employer's defense of Executive
Order 11246, he would remand the case
for a determination as to whether the plan
comports with the requirements of that
Order. While the majority notes that ex-
ecutive orders cannot override legislative
enactment, Judge Wisdom states that
there have been legislative acts which im-
plicitly exempt plans following the Execu-
tive Order "from the constraints of Title
VII."
Other recent developments in the so-
called "reverse discrimination" area do
not bode well for the advocates of equal
employment opportunity. In four recent
cases, the score is "two to two" on the
question of the constitutionality of a ten
percent minority participation quota for
local public works projects. The Minority
Business Enterprise Amendment, Section
103(f)(2) of the 1977 Public Works
Employment Act, has been found to be in
violation of the Due Process clause of the
Fifth Amendment by the United States
District Court for Vermont in the case of
Wright Farms Construction, Inc. v. Kreps,
46 U.S.L.W. 2372 (12-23-77), and held
to be in violation of both the Fifth
Amendment and Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act by the Central District of
California in Associated General Con-
tractors of California v. Secretary of
Commerce, 46 U.S.L.W. 2371 (11-2-77).
As in Weber, these courts found that ab-
sent proof of prior violations, a quota
system was illegal reverse discrimination.
Thu Southern District of New York in
Follilove v. Kreps, 46 U.S.L.W. 2229
(12-19-77), and the Western District of
Pennsylvania in Constructors Association
of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 46
U.S.L.W. 2371 (10-13-77), found that in
light of past discrimination in the con-
struction industry, the ten percent set-
aside was the only way to end the cycle of
exclusion of minority contractors from
construction projects. The Western Dis-
trict also points out that the December
31, 1978 termination date of the ten per-
cent set-aside is an indication that there is
little likelihood of its becoming an
"entrenched entitlement" for minority
businessmen, a principal objection of op-
ponents of affirmative action.
Whether one calls this ten percent
minority business set-aside and the train-
ing program in Weber reverse discrimina-
tion, benign discrimination, affirmative
discrimination or sifnply affirmative ac-
tion, it is clear that this area of the law
will require substantially more attention
by the appellate courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court regardless of the decision
in the Bakke case.
Bakke, while it may be decided under
constitutional or Title VI grounds, does
not reach the important issues of the
legality of quota hiring of Title VII, nor
the efficacy of affirmative action under
Executive Order 11246, nor the constitu-
tionality of legislative actions for a set-
aside for minority contractors. Admit-
tedly, although the decision in Bakke may
provide an indication of the Supreme
Court's perception of affirmative action of
professional school admissions, the broad
area of equal employment opportunity
awaits decisions in cases such as Weber.
THE FORUM
In this regard, see E.E.O.C. v. A.T. & T.,
556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert filed
8-12-77 sub nom. Alliance of Indepen-
dent Telephone Unions v. E.E.O.C.,
#77-243, Communication Workers of
America v. E.E.O.C.,#77-241,





by Gary L. Crawford
In recent years, the field of administra-
tive law has expanded in scope and sig-
nificance. This growth has been caused by
a number of factors but its impact is clear.
Practitioners are now called upon to
represent clients in proceedings which
may vary widely from the more familiar
practice of the courts. This article will
suggest some practical pointers which
should help chart the way through State
Boards of Review proceedings.
In particular, this article will focus on
the Boards of the Department of Licensing
and Regulations. Within this regulatory
agency are nineteen licensing boards
which have been given the authority to
regulate the activities of licensees. Gonse-
quently, the Boards have the power to
suspend or revoke licenses. The Real
Estate Commission also has the unique
authority to order compensatory payment
to an aggrieved complainant from its
guaranty fund.
Typically, then, an aggrieved consumer
or licensee will consult an attorney
regarding the Board proceeding perhaps
as a prelude to a civil suit. After a com-
plaint is given to a Board, an investigation
is made. If the Board's review panel votes
to hold a hearing on the matter in ques-
tion, a "charge" letter is sent to the
licensee. The letter specifies the date of
the hearing and the laws and regulations
the licensee has allegedly violated. Prior
to the hearing, the attorney should
routinely do several things:
1. Review the Applicable Statute and
Regulations-A number of lawyers ap-
pear at hearings and then request a mini-
course on Board procedure. This ap-
proach, of course, does not impress clients
or the Board. All regulations can be found
in the Code of Maryland Regulations
(COMAR), supplemented by new regula-
tions found in the Maryland Register in
conformity with Art. 41, Sec. 255 of the
Maryland Code (Administrative Pro-
cedure Act). Some regulations outline the
relevant Board procedures for pre-hearing
discovery. Other regulations in fact pro-
vide for a pre-hearing informal meeting
(See e.g., Home Improvement Commis-
sion), at which time the dispute may be
settled.
2. Prepare Pleadings in Advance For a
Guaranty Fund Claim-Frequently, the
Real Estate Commission will decide the
merits of a case the same day. Therefore,
evidence regarding the amount of the
guaranty fund claim may be received dur
ing the course of the hearing. The com-
bination of a claim from the fund and a
subrogation agreement with other plead
ings may obviate the need for a subse-
quent hearing on the amount of the claim
which might be heard months later.
3. Watch a Hearing Prior to Your
Hearing Date--Due to the wide range of
businesses licensed, each of the various
boards is unique in the way in which cases
are handled. Most Boards schedule hear-
ings at regular intervals. Consult the Daily
Record, the Maryland Register, or call the
Executive Director of the Board for hear-
ing information.
At the hearing, it is important that
several points be kept in mind.
1. Procedure-The complainant's case is
argued by an Assistant Attorney General
who is known as the Presenter of the Evi-
dence. After presentation of the complai-
nant's witnesses and case, the licensee is
allowed to put on his case. During the
hearing, the Board and both sides may ask
questions of the witnesses. A closing argu-
ment which is brief is generally favored
over a more lengthy presentation.
2. Evidence-It is1well settled that hear-
say is admissible due to the fact that the
proceeding is administrative in nature.
See generally, DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW;
See also, Redding v. Bd. of County
Comm. for Prince George's County, 263
Md. 94, 282 A.2d 136, cert. denied 406
U.S. 923 (1971). It is important to
remember that usually the members of the
Board are very experienced in their field.
Since the Board has a great deal of discre-
tionary power, successful petitioners will
argue the facts of the case rather than
complex legal technicalities.
3. Appeals-After the hearing, the Board
will issue its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law. If the decision of the Board
is adverse, an aggrieved party may pursue
an appeal under the statutory framework
contained in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, supra. For a concise summary
of the process of appeal from an Adminis-
trative Board see Mr. Henry R. Lord's ar-
ticle in the Maryland Bar Journal, Sum-
mer 1977, at page 49.
While the growth of administrative law
provides new challenges and problems for
the busy practitioner, the administrative
hearing procedure also provides an effec-
tive structure for dispute settlement.
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